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STREAM ACCESS IN MONTANA AFTER GALT V. STATE
Holly Hunter
I. INTRODUCTION
The state of Montana, home to countless scenic rivers and streams,
provides a myriad of recreational activities. Fly fishing, kayaking, canoe-
ing and duck hunting are among the activities available in Montana to the
recreating public. In recent years, these recreationists have sought to gain
unfettered access to state rivers and streams.' In contrast, private landown-
ers located adjacent to state rivers and streams often seek to curtail the
recreationists' quest for such unfettered stream access. Consequently, as
recreation becomes more important to the lifestyle of Americans, and
likewise to the economy of Montana, conflicts between private landowners
and recreationists inevitably occur.
In 1984, two Montana Supreme Court decisions, Montana Coalition
for Stream Access v. Curran2 and Montana Coalition for Stream Access v.
Hildreth,3 were the result of just such a conflict between recreationists and
private landowners. These decisions broke new ground in Montana stream
access law by providing liberal stream access for recreational purposes to
the state's waters and underlying and adjacent lands. Legislative action
quickly followed the two decisions, resulting in new statutes broadly
interpreting the Curran and Hildreth decisions."
I. Recreationists in other states have also sought to gain access to their state rivers and streams.
See. e.g., Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961) (public granted right to use state waters for
floating water crafts); State v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945) (court held
public entitled to use and enjoyment of waters regardless of underlying land ownership); People v.
Mack, 19 Cal. 3d. 1040,97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1971) (plaintiff granted mandatory injunction compelling
defendant to remove wires and fencing from across the Fall River); Southern Idaho Fish & Game v.
Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96 Idaho 360, 528 P.2d 1295 (1974) (public granted right to use waters, beds
and channel of state rivers and streams). But see People v. Emmert, 198 Colo. 137, 597 P.2d 1025
(1979) (conviction of criminal trespass affirmed against recreational boater based on private ownership
of streambed under headwaters).
2. - Mont. -, 682 P.2d 163 (1984).
3. - Mont. -, 684 P.2d 1088 (1984).
4. Codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to-322 (1985). Sections pertinent to thiscasenote
are set forth below:
23-2-302. Recreational use permitted-limitations--exceptions.
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) through (5), all surface waters that are
capable of recreational use may be so used by the public without regard to the ownership of
the land underlying the waters.
(2) The right of the public to make recreational use of surface waters does not include,
without permission or contractual arrangement with the land owner:
(a) the operation of all-terrain vehicles or other motorized vehicles not primarily
designed for operation upon the water;
(b) the recreational use of surface waters in a stock pond or other private impoundment
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Immediately following the enactment of these new stream access
statutes, Montana landowners challenged the statutes' constitutionality.
The result, Gait v. State,5 is the most recent Montana Supreme Court
decision addressing public access to state streams and rivers and the
underlying and adjacent lands. While Galt is the most recent decision in
this continuing debate over public and private rights to state waters and the
corresponding lands, it is undoubtedly not the last. This casenote examines
the Gait decision and its impact on both the public's recreational use rights
and the rights of private landowners located adjacent to streams and rivers.
II. BACKGROUND
Until 1984, Montana stream access law appeared well settled. The
streambed between low water marks on navigable streams belonged to the
state in trust for the people of the state.6 Title to the lands bordering
navigable waters above the low water mark belonged to the adjacent
landowner.7 However, the landowner's title to these adjacent lands was
fed by an intermittently flowing natural watercourse;
(c) the recreational use of waters while diverted away from a natural water body for
beneficial use pursuant to Title 85, chapter 2, part 2 or 3, except for impoundments or
diverted waters to which the owner has provided public access;
(d) big game hunting except by long bow or shotgun when specifically authorized by the
commission;
(e) overnight camping within sight of any occupied dwelling or within 500 yards of any
occupied dwelling, whichever is less;
(f) the placement or creation of any permanent duck blind, boat moorage, or any
seasonal or other objects within sight of or within 500 yards of an occupied dwelling,
whichever is less; or
(g) use of a streambed as a right-of-way for any purpose when water is not flowing
therein ...
23-2-311. Right to portage-establishment of portage route..
(3). . . (e) The cost of establishing the portage route around artificial barriers must be
borne by the involved landowner, except for the construction of notification signs of such
route, which is the responsibility of the department. The cost of establishing a portage route
around artificial barriers not owned by the landowner on whose land the portage route will
be placed must be borne by the department.
5. - Mont. - , 731 P.2d 912 (1987).
6. The concept of the public trust developed early in American history. The United States
Supreme Court in Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842) held the original states owned the
beds of their navigable tidal waters to the high water mark. Id. at 413-16. Several years later the United
States Supreme Court in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) recognized the
"equal footing" doctrine which extended the states' ownership to the beds of nontidal navigable waters.
The Court also accorded the same proprietary rights that the original states possessed to newly
emerging states. These streambeds were held in trust for the emerging states and passed to them upon
statehood to be administered for the public benefit. Id. at 222.
7. In 1895, the Montana Supreme Court in Gibson v. Kelly, 15 Mont. 417,39 P. 517 (1895) held
that lands between low and high water marks of navigable streams belonged to adjacent landowners.
Id. at 423, 39 P. at 519. Consequently, the court recognized state ownership of navigable beds below the
low water marks. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-201 (1985).
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subject to a statutory public recreational fishing easement and the public's
common law right to navigation, fishery and commerce.' By contrast,
adjacent landowners on nonnavigable streams owned to the middle of the
streambed and no public right of access to these streams existed. 9
In the early 1980s, the Montana Coalition for Stream Access 0
instigated two lawsuits which resulted in the Curran and Hildreth
decisions. At issue in Curran was the public's right to use six miles of the
Dearborn River flowing through private land. The landowner claimed
ownership and the right to regulate the use of the streambed and the banks
of the Dearborn River that passed through his property."
A six member majority of the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the
district court's holding that the public had a right to use the bed, banks and
waters of the Dearborn River. 2 The court first recognized that the federal
log floating test's was appropriate for determining navigability for title
purposes and then found the Dearborn River navigable under this test.14
Thus, the court stated that the bed of the Dearborn River belonged to the
state and the use of waters flowing over them could be regulated only by the
state, not by adjacent private landowners.1 5 However, the court further
stated that title to the underlying bed was immaterial in deciding public
recreational use of state owned waters. 6 The court then adopted a broad
recreational use test to determine when the state's streams and rivers and
the adjacent and underlying lands were available for public recreational
use, holding "any surface waters capable of use for recreational purposes
are available for such purposes by the public . .. "1 7 The court based this
8. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-305 (1985).
9. Id. § 70-16-201.
10. The Montana Coalition for Stream Access is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to obtaining
access to Montana's rivers and streams for public recreational use. Curran, -. Mont. at - , 682
P.2d at 165.
II. Id. at __, 682 P.2d at 165.
12. Id. at -. 682 P.2d at 165.
13. Ownership of a riverbed at the time of statehood substantially affects present ownership.
Waters which were navigable for title at the time of statehood passed to the state and are owned by the
state subject to the common law public trust doctrine. See supra note 6. Whether state waters are
navigable or nonnavigable for title puposes is a federal law question. Brewer-Elliot Oil and Gas Co. v.
United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922). Navigability for title under federal law depends on whether the
water was used or suceptible of use in its ordinary condition as a highway for commerce. The Daniel
Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). One test commonly used by federal courts is the log floating
test. In this test, waters are navigable if the court determines that upon statehood logs or shingles could
be floated down them for purposes of interstate commerce. Puget Sound Power and Light v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 644 F.2d 785, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1053
(1981).
14. Curran. -. Mont. at -, 682 P.2d at 166.
15. Id. at -, 682 P.2d at 170.
16. Id. at -, 682 P.2d at 170, 172.
17. Id. at __, 682 P.2d at 172.
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recreational use test on the common law public trust doctrine and the 1972
Montana Constitution which provides that "[a] ll surface, underground,
flood and atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state are the
property of the state for the use of its people and are subject to
appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law."18 The court also
allowed a concurrent recreational use of streambeds to the high water
mark irrespective of streambed ownership, and granted recreational users
the right to portage around stream barriers in the least intrusive manner.19
Several weeks later, the Montana Supreme Court decided the
companion case, Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth.20 In
Hildreth, the landowner had installed an instream fence and was planning
to install a subsurface cable for the opening day of fishing season.21 The
court upheld the lower court's grant of a permanent injunction, preventing
the landowner from interfering with the public's recreational use of the
Beaverhead River.2
The Hildreth decision, while not approaching the length and depth of
the court's opinion in Curran, is more significant to Montana law. Unlike
the Curran decision, the court in Hildreth did not address navigability for
title but instead relied on the recreational use test. The court reiterated that
the character of the stream, and thus its capability for recreational use,
determined its availability for recreational use.23 The court held that
determining "navigability for title is not necessary or proper when the issue
is one of navigability for use.' 24
During the 1985 legislative session, House Bill 26525 was introduced
in an attempt to codify the Curran and Hildreth decisions. The bill's liberal
stream access provisions were a broad interpretation of the decisions. The
bill divided Montana's waters into Class I and Class II streams. Class I
streams are donsidered navigable under a federal test for title, whereas
Class II streams are referred to as nonnavigable under a federal test. 7
The bill passed during the 1985 legislative session, but the new statute
contained a number of controversial provisions, including a provision
permitting recreational use to the high water mark of both Class I
navigable streams and Class II nonnavigable streams. When authorized by
18. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(3); Curran, -Mont. at - , 682 P.2d at 170.
19. Curran, ' Mont. at - , 682 P.2d at 172.
20. -Mont._, 684 P.2d 1088 (1984).
21. Id. at -, 684 P.2d at 1090.
22. Id. at -, 684 P.2d at 1094.
23. Id. at -, 684 P.2d at 1094.
24. Id. at -, 684 P.2d at 1094.
25. Codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to -322 (1985). See supra note 4 for text of
sections pertinent to this casenote.
26. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-301(2) (1985).
27. Id. § 23-2-301(3).
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the Commission, a recreationist could use Class I navigable streams to the
high water mark for big game hunting by longbow or shotgun. 8 Recrea-
tionists could also camp overnight,29 and erect permanent and seasonal
boat moorages and duckblinds30 Recreational use to the high water mark
of Class II nonnavigable streams included activities such as water fowl
hunting, fishing and boating, but not big game hunting, overnight
camping, boat moorages and duckblinds without permission of the
landowner. Another controversial provision required landowners to estab-
lish and pay for portage routes around their artificial barriers."'
These statutes and the Curran and Hildreth decisions drastically
altered the pre-1984 status of stream access in Montana. Recreationists
were allowed broadly defined recreational rights on navigable streams and
access to many nonnavigable streams and beds which had previously been
under the control of the underlying streambed owner. These broadly
defined recreational rights in Montana waters, beds and banks created
discontent among private landowners, resulting in the Gait decision in
1987.
III. GALT V. STATE
A. Factual Background and the District Court Decision
In June of 1985, State Senator Jack Galt and nine other landowners32
petitioned the Montana First Judicial District Court to declare the new
stream access statutes unconstitutional. These landowner-plaintiffs as-
serted ownership of the streambeds and control of the waters flowing over
them. They alleged the statutes authorized the taking of private property
without providing just compensation. 3
Both the landowners and the state of Montana moved for summary
judgment. 4 The district court found no issues of material fact and granted
summary judgment to the state of Montana. 5 Relying on the doctrine of
stare decisis, the district court held that "since the very point in Curran and
Hildreth is again at issue, this court must follow the principles of law
28. Id. § 23-2-302(2)(d).
29. Id. § 23-2-302(2)(e).
30. Id. § 23-2-302(2) (f). Under the statute, overnight camping and the placement of permanent
and seasonal boat moorages and duckblinds were not allowed within sight of or within 500 yards of an
occupied dwelling, whichever was less. Id. at § 23-2-302(2)(e) and (f).
31. Id. § 23-2-311(3)(e).
32. Plaintiff landowners included Jack Galt, Louise Galt, Phil Rostad, Robert Saunders, Ted
Lucas, James Bottomly, J. Harrison Saunders, Jake Frank, Franklin Grosfield and Lowell Hildreth.
Galt v. State, No. 85-565 (lst Judicial Dist. filed June 14, 1985).
33. Gait, - Mont. at - , 731 P.2d at 913.
34. Gait v. State, No. 85-565, slip op. at 2 (1st Judicial Dist. February 13, 1986).
35. Id. at 3, 16.
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established in those cases,", 6 i.e., title to the beds and banks was irrelevant
in determining the public's recreational use right. Consequently, the
landowners had no claim to the waters and thus no taking of private
property occurred.37
B. Montana Supreme Court Decision
The Montana Supreme Court in Gait examined whether the Montana
public trust doctrine contemplated the uses of the beds and banks set forth
in the new stream access statutes.3 8 In a 5-2 decision, the court in Gait
reaffirmed its Curran and Hildreth positions that the public has a
recreational right to use the state's waters and the beds and banks up to the
high water mark. 9
However, the court declared certain subsections of the new statutes
unconstitutional. Addressing those subsections which provided for a public
right to build duck blinds and boat moorages, and to camp overnight on the
Class I navigable streams, the court held the statute overbroad, stating
these uses were not always necessary for the enjoyment of the water
resource itself 40 Likewise, the court found the big game hunting provision
unconstitutional because the provision was also not necessary for the
public's enjoyment of the state waters."1 Additionally, the court held the
provision requiring landowners to pay the cost of building portages around
their barriers unconstitutional because the landowner receives no benefit
from the portage.4
IV. ANALYSIS
In both Curran and Hildreth, the Montana Supreme Court recog-
nized a public right to use recreationally the state's waters. In these
decisions, the court held that capability determined availability. If the
waters were capable of recreational use, they were available for recrea-
tional use.43 The state legislature subsequently interpreted these cases very
broadly in House Bill 265, providing for a very liberal recreational use of
state waters, beds and banks.
The court in Galt narrowed the broad language found in Curran and
Hildreth by stressing that the land adjoining public waters must be used
36. Id. at 15 (emphasis original).
37. Curran, -Mont. at - 682 P.2d at 171.
38. Galt, - Mont. at __, 731 P.2d at 916.
39. Id. at , 731 P.2d at 915.
40. Id. at -, 731 P.2d at 915.
41. Id. at __, 731 P.2d at 916.
42. Id. at - 731 P.2d at 916.
43. Id. at , 731 P.2d at 915; Curran, - Mont. at -, 682 P.2d at 172.
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minimally and only when use of the land is essential to the public's
enjoyment of the waters. However, the court in Galt failed to differentiate
between navigable and nonnavigable streams. This differentiation between
navigable and nonnavigable streams is pivotal in accurately determining
the extent of the public's right to use the beds and banks. The importance of
this differentiation lies in the ownership of the beds. The beds of navigable
streams are owned by the state in trust for the people, not by the private
adjacent landowner." In contrast, the beds of nonnavigable streams are
owned by the adjacent private landowner to the middle of the streambed. 5
Nonetheless, the court in Galt failed to differentiate between naviga-
ble and nonnavigable waters and consequently treated public and private
lands alike. One of the dissenting judges in Galt deemed this a glaring
shortcoming of the majority's opinion and commented on the perplexing
shift from the court's previous holding found in Curran.48 In Curran, the
court found that the adjacent private landowner had no proprietary rights
to the beds of navigable waters because the beds belonged to the state in
trust for the people of the state.47 The court based its holding on the
common law public trust doctrine. 48 In contrast, the majority in Galt
implied that landowners adjacent to navigable streams owned the beds
subject to an easement. 49 However, no support is provided for the
majority's inconsistency with the Curran decision and the apparent
abandonment of the common law public trust doctrine set forth in Curran.
More specifically, the court in Galt found the big game hunting
provision on the Class I navigable streams unconstitutional. The court held
this provision unnecessary to the public's right to use recreationally the
state's waters. 50 While the court may narrow the public's right to use
recreationally the beds of Class II nonnavigable streams, the beds which
are arguably privately owned, the situation with the beds between the low
water marks of Class I navigable streams is different.5 Since the state
owns the beds of navigable waters in trust for the people, the state
legislature or the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks is seemingly
better suited than the courts are to regulate public lands.
The court again failed to distinguish between public and private lands
in its discussion of the new statutory requirement that landowners pay for
the construction of portage routes around barriers the landowners in-
44. See supra notes 6 and 7.
45. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-201 (1985).
46. Gait, - Mont. at _ 731 P.2d at 920 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
47. Curran, -_Mont. at -, 682 P.2d at 168.
48. See supra note 6.
49. Gait, -. Mont. at -, 731 P.2d at 915.
50. Id. at -, 731 P.2d at 916.
51. See supra notes 6 and 7.
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stalled. The majority in Galt found this provision unconstitutional since the
landowners received no benefit from the construction of the portage
routes.52 This argument may have some merit in the context of privately
owned beds and banks. The argument fails however when examined in
light of publicly owned beds and banks. A landowner who runs instream
fences across public land is deriving a benefit from the use of that public
land for private purposes. These fences are a detriment to the public,
interfering with commerce on navigable rivers. Removal of the obstruc-
tions or requiring the landowner to pay for portage routes around the
barriers seems not only appropriate but necessary.
V. CONCLUSION
The court in Galt narrowed the broad language found in Curran and
Hildreth regarding the public's recreational right to use the state's waters,
beds and banks. But the court also obscured the distinction between public
and private lands as it relates to the scope of the public's recreational rights.
By doing so, the court effectively permits landowners to escape public
accountability when they construct fences across public lands. Both
landowners and recreationists are left floundering on the issue of when and
where overnight camping and temporary duckblinds are acceptable.
Consequently, the continuing tension between public and private rights to
state waters and corresponding lands continues.
52. Gait, -Mont. at - 731 P.2d at 916.
[Vol. 8
